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FREE SPEECH IN A DIGITAL ECONOMY:
AN ANALYSIS OF HOW INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS HAVE BEEN
ELEVATED AT THE EXPENSE OF FREE
SPEECH
BERNARD

E.

NODZON, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

An inherent conflict exists between the First Amendment and
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.1 The First Amendment
prohibits the Government from making laws that interfere with a
person's free expression.2 At the same time, the Copyright Clause
allows the Government to grant monopolies over speech. 3 These
monopolies pose a potential burden on free speech rights.4
Individuals may be prohibited from using a particular word
combination because copyright law has removed that combination

* Law Clerk to the Hon. Donald P. Lay, United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. B.A., University of St. Thomas, summa cum laude; J.D.,
William Mitchell College of Law, summa cum laude.
1. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) (recognizing a possible conflict between the First Amendment and
copyright law but ultimately holding that copyright law is a valid speech
restriction).
See also Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2001) (discussing copyright law's relationship with
the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech
and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431,
2433-35 (1998) (reviewing cases involving the conflict between the First
Amendment and copyright law); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV.
1180, 1180-86 (1970) (analyzing copyright law's balance with First
Amendment developments).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Copyright Clause states: "Congress
shall have Power ... to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." Section 106 of the Copyright Act
lists six exclusive rights conferred to the copyright owner. These rights
include the right to publish, copy, perform, and distribute the work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2000).
4. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (listing copyright law as a speech restriction).
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from the public domain.5 The creation of entirely new works may
be prohibited if those works use part of another's copyrighted
expression.
Despite this conflict, the Supreme Court maintains that the
two provisions can coexist.7 The Court has stated that copyright
law balances free speech interests by creating a number of
statutory exceptions. 8 For instance, authors cannot copyright facts
Only the original expression of ideas warrants a
or ideas.'
copyright."0 Further, an expression may not be monopolized in
perpetuity." Copyright protection lasts for a limited amount of
time.' 2 In addition, the Copyright Act allows authors the "fair use"
of other copyrighted works.'3 Every author gives the public the
privilege of using the copyrighted work in a reasonable manner."
These safeguards, according to the Court, balance a copyright
holder's interest in receiving compensation for the original
expression with the public's interest in obtaining access to ideas.'"
Recent developments have caused the balance to shift.
Congress and the courts have extended intellectual property rights
at the expense of free speech. The Second Circuit recently
dismissed a First Amendment challenge to the Digital Millennium
The DMCA prohibits any
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).'6
5. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1180.
6. Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 1, at 2431.
7. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 560.
8. Id. at 547.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
10. Id. at § 102(a). See also Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 892 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating "[s]erious First
Amendment questions would be raised if Congress' power over copyrights were
construed to include the power to grant monopolies over certain ideas.").
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (allowing grants of copyright for
"limited times").
12. Currently, an author receives copyright protection for the author's
entire life plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Fair use allows a third party to use a
copyrighted work for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research. Id. A teacher, for instance, is allowed to
make a limited number of copies of a copyrighted work for classroom use. Id.
Section 107 lists four factors to be considered when determining whether a
particular use is a fair use: 1) the purpose and character of the use; 2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount copied; and 4) the effect of the
use of the market for the copied work. Id.
14. HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260
(1944) (restating the common law definition of fair use). Section 107 of the
Copyright Act codified the common-law definition of fair use. H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 66 (1976).
15. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (stating that "the Act
creates a balance between the artist's right to control the work during the
term of copyright protection and the public's need for access to creative
works.").
16. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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transmission of computer code that allows users to break the
copying lock on copyrighted works.17 Soon after Congress passed
the DMCA, a fifteen-year-old high school student from Norway
composed computer code that allowed users to break the copying
lock on Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs).8 Eric Corley wrote a story
about the discovery and placed the piece on Hacker Quarterly's
Internet site.1" The author also posted the computer code.2" A
week later, every major motion picture company in the United
States filed suit, alleging Corley violated the DMCA. 2' The studios
obtained a preliminary injunction.
Corley argued that the
circumvention code constituted protected speech and that the
DMCA abridged his free speech rights to transmit the code.22 After
a trial on the merits, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York upheld the DMCA and
permanently enjoined any transmission of circumvention code.24
On appeal, the Second Circuit classified the DMCA as a contentneutral restriction that did not burden substantially more speech
than necessary to further the Government's interest. 2 The court
affirmed the injunction. 6
The Corley decision is startling. It moves away from the
Supreme Court's First Amendment precedents and abolishes the
delicate balance between copyright law and the First Amendment.
In Corley, the Second Circuit applied a very deferential standard
of review. The court assumed the government had a substantial
interest in protecting authors' works by barring the transmission
of circumvention code. The court did not closely examine the
importance of this interest or the likelihood that the regulation
17. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000). Computer code that breaks copying locks
is commonly referred to as circumvention code.
18. Corley, 273 F.3d at 437.
19. Id. at 439. Hacker Quarterly is a computer magazine that frequently
publishes articles on new developments in technology. Id. at 435.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 440.
22. Id. at 441.
23. Id. at 442.
24. Id. at 443.
25. Id. at 442.
26. Id. at 435. The DMCA is not the only recent copyright legislation that
has been challenged on First Amendment grounds. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d

372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) challenged the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 379. The act extended an author's copyright term by
twenty years. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000). The act applied to works already
copyrighted, thereby prolonging the copyright of many works that were about
to enter the public domain. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 379. The plaintiffs contend
that extending the copyright of these works infringes the public's right to free
speech. Id. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the issue.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002). The Supreme Court's willingness to
review the case shows the importance of the First Amendment's relationship
with new copyright legislation. Id.
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furthers the interest. The court also failed to seriously consider
alternative means of regulating the speech. It simply declared the
regulation constitutional.27
This deferential standard is not
appropriate for the DMCA.
First Amendment jurisprudence
requires that the statute be subjected to a much more exacting
form of scrutiny.
Part I of this article begins by addressing the threshold
question of whether computer code implicates the First
Amendment. The section demonstrates that computer code falls
within the Supreme Court's definition of "speech." Part II of the
article reviews the Supreme Court's distinction between contentneutral and content-based regulations.
It also reviews the
different standards of review for each category of regulation. Part
III considers the type of scrutiny that should be applied to the
DMCA. This section, which relies on a theory of copyright
developed by Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel, explains that the
DMCA is a content-neutral regulation and should be subjected to a
heightened form of intermediate scrutiny. When subjected to a
higher degree of scrutiny, the regulation does not survive a First
Amendment challenge.
I.

DEFINING "SPEECH" UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. The Supreme Court's Standard
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."28 For the
First Amendment clause to apply in any case, speech must be
involved. 9 Thus, the threshold question in any First Amendment
analysis is whether the challenged regulation implicates speech.3"
In many cases, the determination requires little analysis. The
Supreme Court does not even address the issue in cases involving
political debate, artistic expression, or news reporting.3
The
traditional forms of speech addressed by these cases are often
identified as the types of expression the First Amendment intends
to protect.3" The issue is not as clear in other cases. A regulation
27. Id. at 459.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (discussing as
an initial matter whether the conduct at issue involves speech).
30. See id. (discussing whether conduct sufficiently expresses an idea to
implicate the First Amendment).
31. Katherine A. Moerke, Free Speech to a Machine? Encryption Software
Source Code is Not Constitutionally Protected "Speech" Under the First
Amendment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2000).
32. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 15-19 (1948) (discussing the First Amendment's
importance in public debate and government); Cass Sunstein, Free Speech
Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 301 (1992) (stating "the First Amendment is
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may apply to conduct that has both expressive and non-expressive
elements.
These regulations may fall outside the First
Amendment's definition of speech restriction.
The Court articulated the test for determining whether a
regulation implicates speech in United States v. O'Brien."" David
O'Brien was arrested for burning his draft card. 4 His conduct
violated a statute that prohibited the knowing destruction of a
selective service registration certificate.35 O'Brien claimed the
statute violated his First Amendment rights because burning the
card was an expressive act. 36 The Court held that O'Brien's act
constituted speech for First Amendment purposes.3 7 The Court
recognized that First Amendment protection does not end at the
spoken or written word.3" However, the Court declined to give a
limitless definition of speech. 9 Instead, the Court stated that a
physical act must be sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to classify as speech.4" In O'Brien's case, burning
the draft card during a time of war contained sufficient elements
of communication.4 1
The Court clarified this test in Spence v. Washington." In
Spence, the Court struck down a state statute prohibiting
desecration of the U.S. flag. 3 A student was convicted for affixing
a peace symbol to a flag and hanging it upside down. The Court
found that the student's act constituted expression protected by
the First Amendment.4 5 The Court began its analysis by restating
the O'Brien test. It then noted that an act would be sufficiently
imbued with communication whenever a particularized message is
present and understood by those who view it. 47 In Spence, much
like O'Brien, the Court stated that it was highly likely that the
observers understood Spence's message because the country had
been at war in Vietnam.' Whether a particularized message is
present has become the first line of inquiry when applying the
principally about political deliberation").
33. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
34. Id. at 369.
35. Id. at 370.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 376.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. (proceeding on the assumption that O'Brien's conduct contained
sufficient communicative elements).

42. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
43. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 406.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410-11.
Id.
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O'Brien standard.49
Although the intent to convey a particularized message will
nearly always constitute speech, a specific message is not required
for the First Amendment to apply. For example, the Court held
that participating in a parade that contained no particularized
message constituted speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group." The Court said that a "narrow,
succinctly articulable message was not a condition of
constitutional protection ....
."" If it were, the First Amendment
would not extend to the "unquestionably shielded [works] of
Jackson Pollock, the music of Arnold Shoenberg, or the
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carrol.""
As Hurley suggests, the Court applied the O'Brien test
liberally. Almost any mode of communication that expresses an
idea will be sufficiently imbued with communicative elements
within the purview of the First Amendment. The Court has held
that wearing a black armband, 3 nude dancing,54 campaign finance
expenditures,"5 and commercial advertising 6 classify as speech.57
Sleeping in a park as part of a demonstration of the plight of the
homeless also constitutes speech. ' None of these examples are
speech in a traditional sense. Nevertheless, the Court applied the
First Amendment based on the expressive characteristics of the
conduct.
B. Computer Code as Speech
The first question presented in Universal City Studios v.
Corley"5 was whether computer code constitutes speech. Computer
code "is the instructions people write to tell computers what to
do."65 The code consists of statements written in a programming
49. Ryan Christopher Fox, Old Law and New Technology: The Problem of
Computer Code and the First Amendment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 871, 885 (2002).

See also Spence, 418 U.S. at 411 (explaining how hanging the American flag,
under the circumstances, manifested an intent to convey a "particularized
message".).
50. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
569-70 (1995).

51. Id. at 569.
52. Id.
53. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1969).

54. Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).
55. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976).
56. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 763 (1976).
57. See generally Moerke, supra note 31, at 1010-15 (reviewing the court's
tests for classifying certain conduct as speech).
58. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
59. 273 F.3d 429 (2001).
60. Fox, supra note 49, at 873.
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language.61 The programming languages, "while not intelligible to
many laypeople, are easily read and comprehended by [computer
programming] professionals."" The languages mix "English words
with mathematical symbols that demonstrate the steps the
computer should [execute] .,,63 Computers function by performing
these instructions.64 In Corley, the computer code allowed users to
bypass the security controls on DVDs. 6 A user could download the
software from a web site and then copy the DVD onto a computer
hard drive.66
Although relying on different reasoning, federal appellate
courts have held that computer code constitutes speech.6 7 In
Bernstein v. United States,"' the Ninth Circuit deemed computer
code an intended form of political expression.69 Similarly, in
Junger v. Daley,0 the Sixth Circuit held that source code is an
expressive means of exchanging information, thereby implicating
the First Amendment.7 1
In Corley, the Second Circuit relied on Junger and determined
that circumvention code constituted speech.7 ' The court recognized
the expressive capacity of code and found it within First
61. John P. Collins, Jr., Speaking in Code, 106 YALE L.J. 2691 (1997); see
also Fox supra 49, at 877 (explaining types of codes used by programmers
including LISP, Java, HTML, and XML).
62. Fox, supra note 49, at 877. See also Corley, 273 F.3d at 446 (stating that
while some code is "incomprehensible to readers outside the programming
community... [it] can be, and often is read and understood by experienced
programmers."); Collins, supra note 61, at 2694-95 (reviewing the basics of
code technology).
63. Fox, supra note 49, at 877.
64. Id. at 876.
65. Corley, 273 F.3d at 435-36.
66. Id. at 435-36.
67. See Fox, supra note 49, at 886-903 (reviewing the federal cases
analyzing code); Moerke, supra note 31, at 1024-27 (discussing recent
developments in code cases); Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the
First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 713, 714-18 (2000) (analyzing the
recent decisions in code cases).
68. 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g granted and opinion withdrawn,
192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
69. Bernstein v. United States, 176 F.3d 1132, 1141 n.14 (9th Cir. 1999). In
Bernstien, a professor developed a computer program, in part, to demonstrate
the absurdity of a government regulation requiring the license of certain
programs. Id. After developing the code, the professor brought suit against
the government, challenging the regulation as an unconstitutional prior
restraint. Id. at 1136. The appellate court concluded that the government's
licensing scheme constituted an impermissible prior restraint. Id. at 1147.
70. 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
71. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000).
Similar to
Bernstien, Junger involved a challenge to a regulation that prohibited the
export of computer code. Id. at 483. The court upheld the regulation because
"national security interests can outweigh the interests of protected speech."
Id. at 485.
72. Corley, 273 F.3d at 446, 449.
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Amendment jurisprudence.73 Although the Second Circuit did not
restate the O'Brien standard, the court seemed to utilize the
O'Brien test for determining whether the code was expression.
The court emphasized programmers' ability to communicate using
code. 4
The O'Brien standard is the correct standard to apply to code
cases because computer code has both expressive and nonexpressive features."
Code is functional because it instructs
computers how to operate. 6 At the same time, computer code
allows computer professionals to express ideas about computer
programming." This mixture of functional and expressive features
resembles the expressive and non-expressive action of burning a
draft card. Because computer code contains expressive and
functional features, the O'Brien test should apply to any speech
analysis involving code. Thus, the question to be asked in any
code case is whether there is a sufficient amount of speech imbued
within the code.
Computer code is sufficiently imbued with communicative
elements to satisfy the standards of O'Brien and Spence.
Computer code is a vehicle for communicating specific ideas about
computer programming."'
Professors and researchers write
numerous articles and textbooks describing algorithms, methods,
and data structures."
Many of these discussions use code
examples."0 These examples allow the writer to express ideas
about computer programming efficiently and precisely.81 Code is
the most effective means of communicating complex information
about computers among many experienced programmers."
Furthermore "rc]ode is often used in lieu of other, less cumbersome
expressions ... or demonstrative purposes . . . ."" Computer code
is comparable to music. 4 Though musical scores cannot be read by
73. Id. at 445-46.
74. Id. at 448.
75. See Fox, supra note 49, at 893 (noting the dichotomy between functional
and expressive features of code); see also Junger, 209 F.3d at 484 (stating that
source code has both expressive and functional features).
76. Fox, supra note 49, at 876.
77. Id.
See also Junger, 209 F.3d at 484 (discussing the vast uses of
computer code).
78. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 446; Junger, 209 F.3d at 483; Collins, supra note
61, at 2694; and Fox, supra note 49, at 877 for an explanation of computer
programming as a primary source of communication between computer
programmers.
79. Fox, supra note 49, at 879.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Junger,209 F.3d at 484.
83. Fox, supra note 49, at 879.
84. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (stating
"Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the

First Amendment.").
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laypersons, they are protected as a means of communication
among musicians.85 Similarly, a book written in Sanskrit would be
protected though only understood by those versed in the
language.86 Because code contains expressive elements that allow
programmers
to exchange
information
about
computer
programming, it classifies as speech under the First Amendment.
II.

THE CONTENT DISTINCTION IN FIRST AMENDMENT

Once the court determines that the challenged regulation
implicates speech, the next step is to determine the scope of
protection that the speech enjoys. Not all speech receives identical
protection.87 The scope of protection depends on the type of
regulation at issue.88
The Supreme Court categorizes the
restriction as content-based or content-neutral. 8 The Supreme
Court applies different standards of analysis for each category. 90
In general, content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny
while content-neutral regulations are subject to a form of
intermediate scrutiny. 91 If the regulation cannot overcome the
level of scrutiny applied by the courts, then the speech is protected
and the regulation fails. 2 If, on the other hand, a court does not
protect the speech, then the regulation may stand and fully
restrict the speech. 3 Courts can even impose prior restraints upon
unprotected expression."
A. The Rise of the Content Distinction
The modern Supreme Court primarily decides First
Amendment challenges by distinguishing between content-based
and content-neutral restrictions." This analysis began with the
85. Id. See also Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. at 569 (stating musical
scores are unquestionably protected by the First Amendment).
86. Corley, 273 F.3d at 446.
87. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (1998)
(explaining the different standards of review for speech).
88. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S.
622, 637 (1994) (stating "not every interference with speech triggers the same
degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment") [hereinafter Turner I].
89. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (providing a detailed analysis
of the content distinction).
90. Id. at 189-90.
91. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 642.
92. Id.
93. See id. (stating that the First Amendment does not tolerate
governmental control over the content of speech and explaining the levels of
scrutiny).
94. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973) (holding speech may be restricted once an adequate determination has
been made that it is unprotected by the First Amendment).
95. FARBER, supra note 87, at 21; Stone, supra note 89, at 189.
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Supreme Court's decisions in the 1930s and 1940s.9" By the late
1970s and early 1980s, the content distinction became the most
"pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free
expression."97 The distinction was first clearly declared in Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley." In Mosely, the Court struck
down an ordinance that prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of
a school except peaceful picketing involving a labor dispute.99 The
Court declared that, "above all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."'00 After
Mosley, the categorical approach became the central focus of the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence."'
B. DistinguishingBetween Content-Based and Content-Neutral
Regulations
To determine whether a regulation is content-based or
content-neutral, a court primarily looks to the purpose behind the
regulation.0 2 The express language of the regulation will often
expose that purpose.
A content-based regulation limits "speech
because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it

96. Stone, supra note 89, at 189.
97. Id.
98. 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (explaining the difference between restrictions
based on time, place and manner and restrictions based on subject).
99. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
100. Id. at 95.
101. See FARBER, supra note 87, at 21 (stating, "[Tihe content distinction is
the modern Supreme Court's closest approach to articulating a unified First
Amendment doctrine."). See also Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination
and the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 617 (1991) (stating that the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech
marks the central concern of the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence).
102. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001). The Court first evaluates
the express language of the statute. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526 (stating
that a distinction based on ideas is a content based regulation). If, on its face,
the statute restricts speech on the basis of content, then the regulation
warrants strict scrutiny review. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99 (explaining
that subject based restrictions must be carefully scrutinized). In contrast, if
the language of the statute appears neutral the Court evaluates the intent of
the legislature in enacting the legislation. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526
(stating that the purpose behind the regulation must be examined to
determine whether the regulation is content based or content-neutral); see also
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969)
(holding a regulation that prohibited the wearing of armbands was motivated
only by the school's desire to avoid controversy over anti-war sentiment). The
Court will examine "whether the government has adopted the regulation [to
suppress certain types of expression] because of disagreement with the
message it conveys." Ward, 491 U.S. at 790.
103. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642.
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conveys."1 °4 It suppresses expression of a particular viewpoint
because of its likely communicative impact.0 5 A regulation, for
instance, may attempt to suppress speech because of its potential
to incite violence. 10 6 Laws that restrict anti-government libel,0 7 the
ability to publish information from confidential sources,0 s teachers
from advocating the overthrow of the Government, 9 and racist
fighting words are other examples of content-based regulations."'
In contrast, content-neutral regulations limit expression
without considering the message conveyed or the communicative
impact of the speech."' Examples of content-neutral regulations
include laws that prohibit noisy activities in residential areas,"'
limit expenditures on campaign donations," 3 prohibit the
destruction of draft cards,"' ban billboards in residential
communities,"' impose license fees for parades," 6 or forbid the
distribution of leaflets in public places." 7 For these regulations,
the government regulates only the time, place, and manner of the
speech activities; it does not consider the content of the speech.
C. The Standard of Review for Content-Based Regulations
Determining the constitutionality of
regulation requires a two-step analysis."'

a content-based
First, the Court

104. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
105. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (explaining why
"fighting words," "obscenity" and other forms of speech have not received First
Amendment protection).
106. Id. at 382-83.
107. See id. at 384 n.4 (listing prohibition of anti-government libel as an
example of a content-based restriction).
108. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
109. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
110. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 384 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)). See generally Stone, supra note 89, at 190 (listing similar
examples of content based regulations).
111. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 642.
112. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949) (upholding a prohibition
of loud and raucous noises on any public street).
113. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1976) (upholding regulation
limiting individual contributions to political campaigns).
114. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding
regulation prohibiting the destruction of draft cards).
115. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (invalidating an
ordinance that prohibited homeowners from displaying signs on their
property).
116. See Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 137
(1992) (striking down ordinance permitting government administrator to vary
the fee for parades to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order).
117. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 152 (1939) (invalidating an
ordinance that prohibited any person to distribute leaflets in any street or
way).
118. See Stone, supra note 89, at 194-95 (detailing the analysis of contentbased restrictions).
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determines whether the speech falls into one of the categories of
unprotected expression." 9 These categories include: obscenity; 2 '
false or misleading advertising;' false statements of fact;.22 and
fighting words.' If the speech is of low value, it will receive only
limited First Amendment protection.'24 A court will perform a
categorical balancing test to determine the constitutionality of the
regulation. 5 A court evaluates the "relative value of the speech
and the "risk of inadvertently chilling 'high' value expression."'26
Usually, the Government is free to regulate in the area of low
value speech.'
However, if the burdened speech does not fall within one of
the low-value categories, a court will subject the regulation to
strict scrutiny.2 8 Under strict scrutiny, Congress must narrowly
tailor the law to meet a compelling governmental interest.2 9 The
regulation is presumed invalid and the Government must produce
evidence showing that the regulation advances the compelling
interest.'
For content-based regulations, the legislature's goals
must be more than "legitimate, or reasonable, or even
praiseworthy."'
The law must advance a pressing public
necessity while restricting "as little speech as possible to serve the
goal."'32 Content-based laws nearly always fail constitutional
analysis. '
119. Id. at 194. The unprotected categories of speech are deemed low value
speech. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (1942). The low value theory first
appeared in Chaplinsky. Id. at 572. The Court stated that "certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech ... are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and ... any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id.
120. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
121. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979).
122. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
123. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (1942).
124. Stone, supra note 89, at 195.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (upholding a
statute prohibiting any person to appear in a state of nudity in a public place);
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)
(upholding a Puerto Rican statute that prohibited any advertising of casino
gambling aimed at residents of Puerto Rico); see also New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (noting child pornography can be restricted because it is
outside of First Amendment protection); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25
(1973) (stating that obscene material can be regulated); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (stating
that "[s]ome forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.").
128. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642; Stone, supra note 89, at 196.
129. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
130. Id.
131. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 680 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 312 (striking down a statute that prohibited
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The Supreme Court modified this two-step analysis in R.A. V.
v. City of St. Paul, '4 by making it more difficult for content-based
restrictions to survive a First Amendment challenge. The Court
struck down a Minnesota ordinance that prohibited fighting words
that insult or provoke violence "on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender."'35
The Court objected to the ordinance's
special prohibition on speakers who express particular
viewpoints.'36 This type of content regulation, though it applies to
otherwise low value speech, is subject to strict scrutiny review."'
Thus, the Court firmly established a hostility toward any contentbased restriction.
Content-based regulations receive strict scrutiny review
because they conflict with important First Amendment principles
and values. 3 '
One of the primary purposes of the First
Amendment is to provide the public with a marketplace of ideas
and viewpoints.'39 The Government's role in this marketplace is to
serve as a neutral facilitator in citizens' public discourse, thereby
allowing citizens to weigh the value of another's expression for
themselves.'4 ° The Government violates this role when it seeks to
suppress particular ideas or information.'41
Such "restrictions
raise the specter that the Government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'42 Accordingly,
T

individuals from carrying signs critical of foreign governments); Mosley, 408
U.S. at 92 (invalidating content-based restriction on picketing); Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (refusing to uphold a statute that
prohibited hiring teachers that advocated the overthrow of the government).
Stone has observed that "the Court has invalidated almost every contentbased restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century." Stone,
supra note 89, at 196.
134. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
135. Id. at 380.
136. Id. at 384.
137. Id. at 395-96. The Court stated that the issue was "whether the content
discrimination [was] reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling
interests..." rather than narrowly tailored to meet a substantial interest. Id.
at 395-96 (emphasis added).
138. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 641.
139. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Justice Holmes said:
[WIhen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out.
Id. See also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech,
25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974-78 (1978).
140. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 641.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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143
content-based restrictions require strict scrutiny review.

D. The Standardof Review for Content-NeutralRegulations
A court subjects content-neutral regulations to a less exacting
form of scrutiny - often labeled intermediate scrutiny.'44 A lower
standard of scrutiny applies in these cases because content-neutral
regulations pose a less substantial risk of removing certain ideas
or viewpoints from the public dialogue."' Over the years, the
Supreme Court has utilized a number of different forms of
intermediate scrutiny.'46 In some cases the Court will defer to the
Government and uphold a speech-burdening regulation with little
analysis. "' 7 In other instances, it will apply a more exacting form
of scrutiny and deeply inquire into the motives and effectiveness of
Commentators have identified three distinct
the regulation.'
standards that the Court uses to analyze content-neutral
restrictions.'
1. Deferential Standardof Review - The O'BrienAnalysis
The Court introduced its most deferential standard for
0
The O'Brien
analyzing content-neutral regulations in O'Brien."
Court stated that a content-neutral regulation would be upheld:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2]
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
[31 if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [41 if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
143. Id. at 642. See Stone, supra note 89, at 192 (discussing the rational
behind the content distinction).
144. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642.
145. Id.
146. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
46, 48-50 (1987) (listing the different standards of review the Court uses); see
also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the FirstAmendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37-47 (2001) (analyzing the different forms of
scrutiny applied to content-neutral regulations).
147. See Stone, supra note 146, at 50 (referring to the Court's use of
deferential review).
148. See id. at 36 (noting how the Court's analysis of intermediate scrutiny
ranges from "highly exacting" to "exceedingly deferential").
149. Id. at 46. The Court does not explicitly label its different standards of
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 53-54. It is sometimes difficult to determine the
type of intermediate scrutiny applied in a particular case. Id. at 54. Some
commentators, for instance, cite Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984) as an example of where the Court applied intermediate scrutiny, while
other commentators have said the case is too obscure to tell what type of
scrutiny was applied. See generally Neal E. Devins, The Trouble with Jaycees,
34 CATH. U. L. REV. 901 (1985) (discussing the Court's ambiguous analysis in
Jaycees).
150. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text for a review of the facts of
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furtherance of that interest." '
The first part of the test simply states the requirement for
any federal legislation.1 2 The third part of this test reiterates that
the regulation must be content-neutral.1 3 Thus, in substance the
O'Brien test consists of a two-part analysis: the "regulation must
serve a substantial government interest and must be narrowly
tailored to . . ." achieve that interest. 154
The Court applied this test with considerable deference to the
Government and ultimately upheld the regulation.'
The Court
assumed that the Government had a substantial interest in
providing proof that an individual had registered for the draft. '
It also assumed a substantial interest in facilitating
communication between a registrant and the local draft board and
reminding the registrant to notify the draft board of any address
changes.5 7 The Court did not analyze the importance or substance
of these interests. 58 Instead, it simply declared the interests
substantial.5 9 Seemingly, the Court turned the Government's
legitimate interests into substantial interests. 65
As one
commentator notes, a substantial interest under the O'Brien
formulation is one that is not imaginary rather than one that is
important or weighty. 6
Moreover, the Court did not address whether prohibiting the
destruction of draft cards was the least restrictive means of
furthering the Government's interests.' 2 It simply declared that
the statute was an "appropriately narrow" means of protecting the
Government's goals.' 63 Thus, application of the O'Brien test does
not require the Government to narrowly tailor the regulation.'
All that is necessary is that the regulation helps the Government
achieve its interest in a more effective manner than in the absence
151. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
152. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1202 (1996) (restating the Court's announcement that
regulations "restricting symbolic speech... must be 'within the constitutional
power of the Government'.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 380.
156. Id. at 381.
157. Id. at 379.
158. See Dorf, supra note 152, at 1202-03 (stating that "the O'Brien does not
require that the regulation be the least restrictive means of achieving the
state interest").
159. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
160. See Stone, supra note 146, at 51 (stating that under some formulas the
Court "terms any legitimate governmental interest 'substantial"').
161. Id.
162. Id. at 51.
163. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
164. Stone, supra note 146, at 51.
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of the statute.165 The Court clarified the standard in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism.16 There, the Court held that the requirement of
narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the ... regulation
promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be
67
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."'
In general, the Court applies this test to content-neutral
regulations that burden expressive conduct or for regulations that
restrict the time, place, and manner of speech. 6 ' The O'Brien
application of intermediate scrutiny almost always results in
upholding the regulation."9 Only gratuitous speech inhibitions
will be struck down.' 71 In fact, some commentators compare this
test to the rational-basis standard employed for equal protection
review. 7 ' Under the O'Brien test, a court avoids analyzing the
importance of the governmental interest and does not investigate
the alternative ways in which the Government could accomplish
its objectives.172 The regulation will survive so long as it furthers
some legitimate governmental interest. 173
2. Middle-Tier Intermediate Scrutiny - The TurnerAnalysis
The Court has also developed a middle-tier standard of
intermediate scrutiny.'v This test uses the same framework as the
O'Brien test, but applies the standard without deference to the
government."'
Under this test, a court scrutinizes the
substantiality of the governmental interest.16
Middle-Tier
Intermediate Scrutiny tests the legitimacy of the asserted interest
165. Id.
166. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
167. Ward, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (emphasis added) (alteration in
original).
168. Stone, supra note 146, at 50-51.
169. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 781 (upholding a time, place, and manner
restriction on the use of a band shell in a park); see also United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding that the general exclusion of recipients
of bar letters for a military open house does not violate First Amendment);
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (upholding a Government
regulation that prosecuted only those persons who reported themselves as
having violated the law, or who were reported by others); Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (holding that a National Park
Service regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks did not violate the
First Amendment); City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting posting of signs on
public property did not violate First Amendment).

170. Stone, supra note 146, at 50-51. See also Dorf, supra note 152, at 120203 (stating the O'Brien test has no teeth and is meaningless).
171. Stone, supra note 146, at 50.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 52-53.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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and requires much more than a declaration of validity.'77 A court
178
will not assume that any governmental interest is substantial
but rather requires the government to demonstrate that the
restriction furthers the asserted interest.7 9 General assertions
that the regulation is necessary to accomplish the government's
objective will not satisfy the test. 8" Further, a court closely
examines whether the government could accomplish its goals in a
less restrictive manner.'8 1 The availability of less restrictive
test. 182
alternatives will assuredly invalidate the statute under this
Turner I" illustrates the Court's application of middle-tier
intermediate scrutiny. In Turner I, cable television operators
claimed the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 violated their
right to free expression."" The provisions required cable operators
The Court deemed the
to carry local broadcast stations.8
regulation to be content-neutral and began its analysis by
The Court, however,
restating the four-step test of O'Brien.8
applied the O'Brien rule with no deference to the Government.
The Court stated that abstract assertions regarding the
importance of the government's interest would not satisfy the
test.1 1 7 The government must "adequately show . . ."that the
The
regulation "will in fact advance those interests." "'
government must also prove that its regulation "does not 'burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to' . . ." achieve its
goals.'88 Ultimately, the Court remanded the case to determine
whether the regulation was supported by "reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence."' 90
On appeal from remand, the Supreme Court articulated a test
that appears more deferential to Congress than Turner I." In
177. Id.

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
184. See id. at 634 (challenging the constitutionality of the must-carry
provisions).

185. Id. at 630.
186. Id. at 662.
187. Id. at 664.
188. Id. (emphasis added).

189. Id. at 665.
190. Id. at 666.
191. For an analysis of the Turner decisions and their placement in the
middle-tier/intermediate scrutiny category, see Netanel, supra note 146, at 5859; J.I.B., Lessons from the Supreme Court's Turner Broadcasting Decisions,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (1997); THE HARVARD REVIEW ASSOCIATION 1998,
Note: Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases
After Turner Broadcasting,111 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (1998).
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Turner H, however, the Court still examined the district court's
findings of fact and scrutinized the substantiality of the
government's interests.'92 The Court also refused to defer to
Congress to the level it did in O'Brien.'93 Thus, the Turner
decisions require the Government to support its judgments with
"substantial evidence" and allow courts to exercise "independent
judgment" in assessing the evidence."' Subject to this standard, a
content-neutral regulation is often struck down. ' 95
Generally, the Turner standard applies in cases where the
government allots speech entitlements to one speaker or a class of
speakers.'96 The primary examples of speech entitlements are
campaign finance regulations 97 and must-carry cable broadcast
provisions. 98 In these cases, the government allows certain
individuals to control the channels of communication.' 9 The
government allocates these entitlements to further a contentneutral interest. °
The government does not consider the
192. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 520 U.S.
180, 189-97 (1997) [hereinafter "Turner IT].
193. See Netanel, supra note 146, at 58-59 (noting that the Court in Turner
II "looked to [the] lower courts findings of fact, rather than simply deferring to
Congress...").
194. Id. at 58-59 (internal quotations omitted).
195. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C, 518 U.S.
727 (1996) (invalidating two provisions of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act on First Amendment grounds); Vill. of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
(striking down an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door or on-street solicitation);
Stone, supra note 146, at 48-50 (reviewing cases of content-neutral restrictions
analyzed under intermediate scrutiny).
196. Netanel, supra note 146, at 59-62.
197. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000); Buckley, 424
U.S. 1, 17 (1976). Campaign finance restrictions can be viewed as a speech
entitlement because donations allow certain individuals a greater opportunity
for political expression. The Court has applied middle-tier intermediate
scrutiny in these cases. Buckley.424 U.S. at 17-21.
198. See Denver Consortium, 518 U.S. at 732-33 (upholding only one
provision of a statute that blocked cable programs aimed at the compelling
interest of protecting children); see also Turner I, 512 U.S. at 637 (refusing to
apply a "less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast
regulation[s] ...").
199. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656.
200. In Turner I, for instance, the Government attempted to prevent the
eradication of broadcast television stations. Id. at 647; Netanel, supra note
146, at 58-59. This interest was content-neutral because it did not consider
the viewpoint or content of the broadcast. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 647. In
reviewing the challenge, the Court recognized that regulations that
discriminate among media or among different speakers within a single
medium often present serious First Amendment concerns. Id. at 637-38. The
Court then ruled that despite favoring local off-air broadcasters over cable
operators, the must-carry provisions did not evince the illicit governmental
purpose of seeking to distort the marketplace of ideas. Id. Rather, the
provisions represented a content-neutral response to the physical bottleneck
characteristics of the cable medium and the perceived economic vulnerability
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viewpoint or subject matter of the speech when doling out speech
entitlements.2 0 1
The speech entitlements, however, receive a
higher form of intermediate scrutiny because they raise concerns
about improper government motive. °2 By doling out speech
allotments, the government could favor certain speech or
particular groups over the public at large.2 0 3 As a result, a court
evaluates the regulation more closely and cannot assume that it is
substantial and narrowly tailored.2 4
Under Middle-Tier
Intermediate Scrutiny, a court tries to ensure that the government
has given adequate weight to the First Amendment burdens that
speech entitlements impose.00
3. Strict Intermediate Scrutiny - The BartnickiAnalysis
The final type of intermediate scrutiny applied by the
Supreme Court is often labeled strict intermediate scrutiny.0 6
This test requires "a compelling rather than substantial
governmental interest.
,,2 7 It also requires that the government
show that "the challenged restriction is 'necessary' to achieve that
interest."0 0 Strict intermediate scrutiny mirrors the Court's test
for content-based regulations .2'
Almost all content-neutral
regulations subject to this test will fail. 10
Bartnicki v. Vopper" demonstrates the Court's most recent
application of this test. In Bartnicki, the Court struck down a law
forbidding the disclosure of information obtained from illegally
intercepted cell phone conversations.1
The case arose after an
of the local broadcast industry. Id. at 661.
201. Id. at 647.
202. Netanel, supra note 146, at 59.

203. Id.
204. Id. at 60.

205. Id.
206. Stone, supra note 146, at 52.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 118-127 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's
review of content-based regulations).
210. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Com'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983) (declaring a special tax statute unconstitutional for lack of a
compelling state interest); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm.,
459 U.S. 87 (1982) (holding the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law
unconstitutional because there was no "'substantial relation between the
information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest."')
(alteration in original); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982) (declaring a statute requiring portions of rape trial closed to the public
because it was not narrowly tailored enough to meet the state's compelling
interest); NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (finding unconstitutional a
statute prohibiting the NAACP from soliciting despite the state's substantial
interest in regulating the practice of law).
211. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
212. Id. at 518.
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unidentified person intercepted a cell phone conversation between
Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane, two persons representing
local teachers in a collective-bargaining dispute.213
Fredrick
Vopper, a radio commentator, played a tape of the intercepted
conversation on his talk show. 214 Bartnicki filed suit under the
federal and state wiretapping laws. 1' All members of the Court
agreed that the federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping statutes
were content-neutral." 6 The Court then applied its most rigorous
standard of intermediate scrutiny.217 The Court said that a
content-neutral regulation that prohibits publication of the
lawfully obtained, truthful information must be struck down
"absent a need ...
of the highest order." '18
When strict
intermediate scrutiny is applied, the government must also
produce evidence indicating that the regulation actually fulfills the
stated governmental objective.2" '
This test most often applies to regulations that involve
members of the media. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,"' the Court applied strict
intermediate scrutiny to invalidate a content-neutral statute
imposing a tax on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in
production of publications.22 ' In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court,222 the Court invalidated a provision of a content-neutral
statute that excluded the press from certain criminal trials.
Despite the state's compelling interest, the Court ruled that the
statute was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.223 The
rationale for applying the highest form of intermediate scrutiny to
these cases was that restrictions upon the press substantially
diminish the opportunities for free expression. 24 The laws in these
cases have great potential to "restrict the flow of speech into the
'marketplace of ideas'."2 The Court's concern is with the interest
2 6
of the entire community, not just the parties involved in the suit.
Thus, the highest degree of scrutiny must apply, even though the
213. Id. at 518-19.
214. Id. at 519.
215. Id. at 520.
216. Id. at 526.
217. See id. at 527-28 (stating that a newspaper could not be punished for
publishing truthful information it obtained lawfully "absent a need... of the
highest order.") (omission in original).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 529.
220. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
221. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585 (declaring a special tax statute
unconstitutional for lack of a compelling state interest).
222. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
223. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-09.

224. Stone, supra note 146, at 71.
225. Id. at 75.
226. Id.
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regulations are content-neutral.2
III.

7

APPLYING FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES TO THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

Application of the Supreme Court's First Amendment
principles to the DMCA demonstrates the Second Circuit's error in
labeling circumvention code low-level speech. The Second Circuit
deemed the act to be a content-neutral regulation.2 8 The court
then applied the most deferential form of intermediate scrutiny;
the O'Brien standard. The court assumed that the government
had a substantial interest in passing the legislation and did not
fully consider less restrictive means of regulating the speech. '
The court declared that "[t]he Government's interest in preventing
unauthorized access to encrypted copyrighted material is
unquestionably substantial, and the regulation of [circumvention
code] . . . plainly serves that interest. ", 30
Little analysis
accompanied this proposition.
The court simply deferred to
Congress' judgment.
This deferential form of intermediate
scrutiny is inappropriate when analyzing the DMCA in the context
of the Supreme Court's prior decisions. 3 ' The Second Circuit
22
should have applied a heightened form of intermediate scrutiny.
A. The Standard That Should Be Applied to the Digital
Millennium CopyrightAct
The DMCA is best classified as a content-neutral regulation.2 33
The Act prohibits the transmission of code that is designed to
circumvent a technological measure that controls access to a
copyrighted work.22 4 It burdens speech without considering the
content of the expression, and it applies evenly to all speakers.2 5
227. Id. at 58.
228. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Netanel, supra note 146, at 77 (advocating rigorous Turner scrutiny
of the DMCA).
232. See generally id. at 81 (advocating for heightened scrutiny to be applied
to the DMCA and similar copyright legislation).
233. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 (disagreeing with the argument that the
DMCA is content-based). See also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Benkler &
Lessig at 5-6, Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001) (No.
00-9185),
available
at
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVD-cases/
20010126_ny_2profs-amicus.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002) (explaining that

the DMCA is a content-neutral regulation).
234. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000). Section 1201(a)(2) states that "[n]o
persons shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology ... that is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title." Id.
235. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454.
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In Corley, the plaintiff argued that the DMCA should be classified
as a content-based regulation because liability turns on the
content of the computer code.236 The Supreme Court, however,
2 37
categorizes a regulation by looking at the purpose of the statute.
A content-based regulation occurs when the government restricts
speech to suppress or favor a particular viewpoint or subject
matter.2 8 The DMCA, like most copyright statutes, intends to
protect the copyrighted works of authors so that they may reap the
full benefits of their work. 3 ' In enacting the law, the government
did not take a position on the viewpoint or subject matter of the
burdened speech. Thus, the regulation should be considered
content-neutral.
Since the DMCA is content-neutral, it must be subject to a
form of intermediate scrutiny. 240 The most appropriate form of
scrutiny to be applied to any newly enacted copyright legislation is
middle-tier intermediate scrutiny, the Turner analysis.241 Turner
scrutiny is appropriate because copyright law acts as a speech
allotment.4
Copyright law removes particular expression from
the public domain and allows the author to monopolize that
expression for a lengthy period of time. 243 This allocation of
expression resembles the speech entitlements of Turner. Just as
Turner assigned channels of expression to particular parties,
copyright law entitles authors to a particular type of expression.
Laws enacted for the purpose of furthering a copyright holder's
speech entitlement should be subject to a higher degree of
scrutiny. The DMCA intends to protect a copyright holder's
interest by prohibiting code that allows users to copy protected
works. 2" The DMCA seeks to further the speech entitlement
scheme by strengthening an author's control over his or her
236. Appellant's Supplemental Letter Brief at 1, Universal Studios v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429 (2001) (No. 00-9185), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/
MPAADVDcases/20010530_ny-eff-suplbrief.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2002). Corley classifies the act as content-based because it targets scientific
expression based on the particular topic addressed by that expression namely, techniques for circumventing the copying locks on DVDs. Id.
237. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526. See also supra notes 102-110 and
accompanying text (explaining the methods used to determine whether a
statute is content-based or content-neutral).
238. Bartniki, 532 U.S. at 526.
239. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 15 (1998).
240. See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text of Analysis Section
11(d) for an explanation of the intermediate scrutiny as applied to contentneutral regulations.
241. See Netanel, supra note 146, at 67-69 (advocating for intermediate
scrutiny to be applied to all copyright legislation). See also Amici Brief, supra
note 233, at 5-6 (stating that intermediate scrutiny is the most appropriate
form of analysis for the DMCA).
242. Netanel, supra note 146, at 67.
243. Lessig, supra note 1, at 1065.
244. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 15 (1998).
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expression.4
Because the DMCA furthers speech entitlements,
courts should evaluate the legislation in the same manner as the
Supreme Court analyzed the cable regulations in Turner I and
Turner I. Under that analysis, evidence must be produced to
show that the government gave adequate weight to the First
Amendment burdens imposed by the speech entitlement.246
Copyright law should also be subject to a higher degree of
scrutiny because the interest groups affected often draft
247
statutes.
Congress drafted the first copyright act in 1790.248 In
the first decade of the twentieth century, Congress needed to
update the law.249 Congress, however, deemed the statute "too
250
complex to entrust to normal American legislative processes."
Instead, the legislators called upon representatives of industries
with interest in copyright to shape the new statute.25' Congress
has relied on interest groups to negotiate and draft new versions of
copyright statutes ever since. 2 In many cases, new copyright laws
reflect outright congressional rubber-stamping of industry-drafted
legislation with little or no committee record to support the
legislation.253 Congress' consultation with industry professionals
does not automatically subject a regulation to heightened
scrutiny. 254 However, the specter of an improper motive is raised
when the very persons receiving the benefits of speech
entitlements draft the statutes regulating their distribution.5
These regulations must withstand a closer analysis of the
governmental interests and must demonstrate that they are

245. Id.
246. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665 (stating that the government "bears the
burden of showing that the remedy it has adopted does not 'burden
substantially more speech than is necessary'...").
247. Netanel, supra note 146, at 67. See also Jessica Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 869-79 (1987)
(analyzing the negotiations among industry stakeholders during the drafting
of the Copyright Act of 1976); Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus:
CongressionalResponses to Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act, 36
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 109, 111 (1989) (discussing the methods of passing
copyright legislation).
248. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35 (2001).
249. Id. at 36.
250. Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-PeerTechnology,
28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1006 (2002).

251. LITMAN, supra note 248, at 36.
252. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 522 (1999) (describing the intense lobbying by Hollywood
movie studios to pass the DMCA).
253. Netanel, supra note 146, at 68.
254. Id. at 69.
255. See id. 68-69 (explaining that legislation granting speech entitlements
to the industry bidders responsible for shaping and drafting the legislation
should be subject to rigorous scrutiny).
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Otherwise,
narrowly tailored to accomplish those interests.
Congress runs the risk of passing legislation that dispenses speech
entitlements to industry bidders at the expense of the public at
large.5 7 In fact, some commentators contend that copyright's
legislative process has already contributed to significant benefits
to private interests without consideration of the diffuse, external
costs to future generations.5 8
Copyright law may also lend itself to a higher degree of
scrutiny because of its fragile balance with First Amendment
law. 9 The Supreme Court has ruled that the Copyright Clause
and the First Amendment can coexist even though the First
Amendment protects freedom of speech while the Copyright
Clause grants monopolies over speech.2 ' 0 According to the Court,
the internal restraints of copyright law construct a delicate
balance with the First Amendment.2 1 ' The copyright statute does
not allow authors to monopolize ideas and allows for a number of
Copyright law
non-infringing uses of copyrighted speech.2"2
to provide
necessary
the
point
only
to
supposedly abridges speech
furthering
thereby
more
speech,
produce
to
incentives for authors
the arts and sciences.6 3 Since the two clauses contain a delicate
balance, any new copyright legislation requires careful scrutiny to
ensure that the burden imposed upon speech is necessary and
narrowly tailored to advance the arts and sciences. Without a
careful analysis, a court could allow Congress to pass legislation
that destroys this balance - as it appears the Second Circuit has
done with the DMCA.
Finally, a deferential analysis is inappropriate because the
context of Corley differs dramatically from the context of O'Brien.
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court applied a deferential standard
because the speech conduct impacted a government program
involving military affairs. The Court provides Congress the

256. Id. at 69.
257. Id. at 68.
258. Netanel, supra note 146, at 68. See also Yochai Benkler, Overcoming
Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment,
111 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 299 (1998) (explaining how a lack of legislative
control harmed the radio business).
259. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (stating there is a
balance between copyright law and the First Amendment); see also Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 545 (stating that copyright law is balanced with the First
Amendment).
260. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
261. Id.
262. Id. See also supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text (explaining that
copyright laws do not give complete monopolies on speech to authors).
263. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557 (stating that without copyright, a
great deal of speech would not exist because authors would have little
incentive to create new expression).
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greatest amount of deference in areas of military affairs.2 6 4 It will
nearly always uphold a regulation that helps promote national
defense.6 In the Court's view, O'Brien's burning of the draft card
affected the efficient implementation of the selective service
program.2 6 The draft board used the regulation to prove that an
individual had registered for the draft and to facilitate
communication between the registrant and the local draft board.6 7
In such cases, a court will nearly always uphold the regulation and
defer to Congress.6
However, Corley does not involve impact on a government
program.
The impact is instead on the public's access to
information and on the public's ability to develop new technology.
Thus, it would be inappropriate to give the DMCA a deferential
review. Instead, a high degree of intermediate scrutiny should
apply.6
B. Application of Middle-Tier Scrutiny to the DigitalMillennium
Copyright Act
The DMCA cannot satisfy the application of Turner
scrutiny. 7
Turner scrutiny requires that the law serve an
important governmental interest in a manner no more restrictive
than necessary.2' The Government's primary purpose in passing
the DMCA, like all other copyright legislation, was to promote the

264. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981). In Rostker, the Court
used a rational basis analysis to uphold a congressional regulation that
excluded women from military combat but allowed men to participate in
combat. Id. at 64-65. The Court said: "[t]his is not.., merely a case involving
the customary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case arises in
the context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs,
and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater
deference." Id.
265. Id.
266. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968).
267. Id. at 378-79.
268. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65.
269. See Netanel, supra note 146, at 74-81 (discussing the impact the DMCA
will likely have on access to information and advocating for a higher degree of
scrutiny when analyzing the act).
270. Because the DMCA will not survive middle-tier intermediate scrutiny,
this article will not subject the DMCA to strict intermediate scrutiny. It
should be noted that the particular facts in Corley could allow a court to use
strict intermediate scrutiny. Corley involves the posting and reporting of
lawfully obtained information that is of interest to the public. Corely, 273 F.3d
at 435-36. Bartnicki involves the use of similar information. Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 518-19. Further, Corley involves suppressing the speech of the media.
Corely, 273 F.3d at 435-36. The DMCA would survive Bartnicki only if the
governmental interest was of the highest order. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28.
Because this article will demonstrate that the Act does not survive Turner
scrutiny it will be assumed that the DMCA also fails strict scrutiny.
271. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 662.

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:109

arts and sciences.272 Promoting the arts and sciences traditionally
means providing increased public access to works of authorship. 7 3
The ultimate goal of copyright legislation is to foster the
dissemination and creation of intellectual, literary, or artistic
works for the public welfare.2 74 The DMCA attempts to further
this interest by ensuring that copyright owners receive the fullest
economic benefits from their work. 75 With new advances in digital
technology, copyright holders felt additional mechanisms were
needed to protect their works from unauthorized copying. 76
Advancing the arts and sciences by helping authors protect their
copyrighted works certainly classifies as an important, if not
compelling, interest. 77 After all, the Constitution expressly gives
Congress the power to promote the arts and sciences through
copyright legislation.178 Turner scrutiny, however, requires "that
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and
material way." 79 Thus, in applying Turner scrutiny, the first
question is whether the studio plaintiffs have adequately shown
that studios face a threat of losing revenue and that the progress
of arts and sciences will be stunted without the DMCA.
1. The Act Does Not Promote the Arts and Sciences
Little evidence exists showing that the DMCA promotes the
arts and sciences. In fact, most of the evidence proves the
opposite. For instance, the DMCA greatly reduces access to works.
Prior to adopting the DMCA, content owners controlled only the
use of their copyrighted material. Any use by a third party that
fell into one of the six exclusive rights of copyright would
constitute an infringement. Under the DMCA, content owners
272. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 15 (1998) (explaining the intent of
Congress). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving congress the power to
pass copyright legislation for the purpose of promoting the arts and sciences);
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating
that copyright legislation is "intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired").
273. Schaumann, supra note 250, at 1024.
274. Id. at 1024-25.
275. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 15 (1998). The senate report states the purpose
of the act is to "make digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit
copyrighted materials." Id. at 2.
276. Id. It has become increasingly easy to copy and distribute digital works
over the Internet. Id. at 8. As a result, Congress predicted "copyright owners
[would] hesitate to make their works readily available [over] the Internet ... "
unless the works were "protected from massive piracy." Id. The DMCA
attempts to provide authors with this protection. Id.
277. Amici Brief, supra note 233, at 6.
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
279. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 664.
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now control access to their digital works. In essence, Congress has
granted copyright holders a new right. With this new right,
content owners can lock-up not only their copyrighted works, but
also works that belong in the public domain. As Professor Netanel
notes, "nothing in the Act requires content providers to use
[encryption] technology only for copyrighted works or only for
portions of content that are protected by copyright.""' By allowing
the content owners to control access to the works, the owners may
now prohibit permitted uses of digital works. This will greatly
reduce the public's access to literary, artistic, and scientific
creations.
There are other reasons why the DMCA does not conform to
its constitutionally mandated purpose.
Many of the works
protected by the DMCA did not need another incentive for
creation. 81 The works had been produced prior to the passage of
the act, indicating that this extra protection played no role in
authors' incentive to create the work. If the current structure of
the copyright statute provided sufficient incentive to produce these
works, then any further protection is not necessary.
Further, the DMCA inhibits the growth of science because it
prohibits researchers and professors from publishing new
discoveries in circumvention code technology.282
Recently, a
Princeton University professor wished to publish research that
revealed the weaknesses of digital copy-protection technologies. 82
He "planned to publicly present his paper at a conference." 84 He
withdrew from the conference, however, "after receiving what he
characterized as a threat of a lawsuit from the movie and
recording studios."28 ' The professor brought a suit against the
companies, claiming that the studios' threats of litigation
prevented him from presenting academic findings. 86 The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed his
suit, holding he had no legal complaint against the studios. 87
This case illustrates the chilling effect the DMCA has upon
280. Netanel, supra note 146, at 75.
281. This argument has been used in the recent challenge to the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 376-77
(D.C. Cir. 2001). The plaintiffs argued that the CTEA did not promote the arts
and sciences because the authors did not need the term extension as an
incentive to produce previously copyrighted works. Id.
282. See Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily, Nov. 30, 2001,
Copyrights: Court Delivers From Bench Dismissalof Researcher's Objections to
DMCA Provisions at 1 (explaining the dismissal of a suit claiming the DMCA
prohibited publication of research exposing weaknesses in copy-protection
technology).
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286.
287.
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scientific development. The act does not accomplish its stated
purpose; it does not promote the arts and sciences. Instead, it
stunts the development of more advanced forms of digital code
production.
The movie industry responded by claiming that the
transmission of circumvention code would severely reduce revenue
because consumers would no longer purchase DVDs 9 9 Without
that flow of revenue, the studios argued they would be unable to
produce new works for the public. 9 The studios, however, were
unable to point to any instance where circumvention code had
resulted in a loss of revenue. They only indicated that allowing
the transmission of circumvention code could reduce DVD sales.
The studios made a similar argument in 1984 when Sony invented
the videocassette recorder."'
The studios claimed that Sony
should be prohibited from selling the new technology because it
allowed users to record copyrighted material.29 ' The Supreme
Court rejected the argument and held that the availability of the
new equipment did not amount to illegal copying so long as it was
capable of non-infringing uses.292 Home video sales now account
for the majority of movie studio revenues. 293 The availability of
Sony's new technology did not inhibit the dissemination of new
creative works, just as the availability of circumvention code has
not been shown to retard the production of new movies. Thus, it
has not been proven that the DMCA's prohibition of transmitting
circumvention code helps further the purpose of the act, promoting
the arts and sciences.
2. The Act Does Not Accomplish its Purpose by the Least
Restrictive Means
Even if the movie studios were able to survive the first prong
of Turner scrutiny, they still must show that the remedy adopted
by the Government "does not burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further [its] interests."2 94 Turner requires a
court to conduct a careful analysis of the scope of the statute and
consider any less restrictive alternatives. ' As applied, the DMCA

288. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. 294, 315

(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
289. Id.
290. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 424-25

(noting the perceived threat that VCR'S posed to movie and television studios).
291. Id. at 425.
292. Id. at 442.
293. See Dick Kelsey, Video-On-Demand? Not So Fast, NEWSBYTES NEWS
NETWORK, Jan. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3447462 (noting that home
video accounted for nearly 75 percent of movie studio revenue in 2000).

294. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 662.
295. Id.
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cuts off all forms of circumvention computer code.9 It makes no
exception for the use of the code for legitimate, speech-related
purposes, including access to movies that are no longer
copyrighted or scholarly studies of code. 97 In fact, the Second
Circuit conceded that the act prohibits publication of scientific
studies about the circumvention computer code and limits fair
uses 298 of copyrighted works.299 The Second Circuit acknowledged
that its ruling would prevent, for example, the use of digital
quotations from a film by a movie reviewer, digital analysis of
portions of the sound track by a musicologist, or clips of scenes by
a film scholar to make a comparative point."' All of these fair uses
helped create a balance between copyright law and the First
Amendment.0 1 In fact, these types of illustrations are what the
Supreme Court pointed to when it said that copyright law would
not infringe upon the First Amendment. 0 2 The DMCA eliminates
these examples, and at the same time eliminates the internal
restraints that allowed copyright law to coexist with the First
Amendment. Indeed, the Second Circuit has substantially reduced
the public's ability to communicate by upholding the DMCA's
prohibition of circumvention code.
When considering less restrictive alternatives, a court may
The
look to other statutes that address a similar problem. 3
Copyright Act contains two provisions that allow copying of
videocassettes and musical works." 4 The act allows users to use
available technology to make a limited number of copies in those
cases.3" It simply prohibits the sale and mass distribution of those
296. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
297. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 440-41. (discussing the exceptions to the
DMCA).
298. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining the fair use
doctrine).
299. Corley, 273 F.3d at 458-59.
300. Id.
301. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549-51.
302. Id.
303. Denver Consortium, 518 U.S. at 742. The Court said: a court "can take
Congress' different, and significantly less restrictive, treatment of a highly
similar problem as at least some indication that more restrictive means are

not essential (or will not prove very helpful)." Id. at 758.
304. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(2) (2000) (prohibiting VCR manufactures from

implementing technologies that would prevent users from making copies of
VCR cassettes); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000) (permitting fair and noninfringing users to make a limited number of copies of a copyrighted audio
work but not permitting serial copying of the work); see generally Amici Brief,

supra note 233, at 5 (pointing to these provisions as adequate alternatives to
protect an author's copyrighted work).
305. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(2) (2000) (permitting the use of certain copying
devices for particular purposes); see also 17 U.S.C. § 100 2 (a) (2000)
(permitting the distribution of certain copying devices that conform to
specified regulations).
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copies." 6 These two provisions have carved exceptions so copyright
holders will not have total control over expression. They serve the
same purpose as the DMCA, but do so using less restrictive
means. Following these provisions as a model would have allowed
the DMCA to protect copyrighted works and still maintain a
balance with the First Amendment. Instead, Congress chose to
impose a complete ban on circumvention computer code. The
Second Circuit acknowledged that these less restrictive
alternatives were available." 7 Nevertheless, the court deferred to
Congress and assumed that Congress had avoided burdening more
speech than is necessary to further its interests.0 8 The court did
not carefully analyze available alternatives.
Had the court
seriously considered less restrictive alternatives, it would have
been forced to invalidate the Act.
CONCLUSION

Passage of the DMCA has eliminated the contours of
traditional copyright law that allowed it to dwell in harmony with
the First Amendment. 9
The Second Circuit contributed to
destroying this balance by upholding the law with a very
deferential form of analysis." ' This decision follows in a path of
recent appellate decisions that elevate intellectual property rights
at the expense of free expression.'
If courts continue to apply
deferential review to copyright legislation, the public interest will
be injured. The dissemination of information and ideas will be
greatly reduced. Speech monopolies will corrupt the marketplace
of ideas. To avoid this result, a greater degree of scrutiny must be
applied when examining copyright legislation. Otherwise, our
digital economy will not live up to its promise of delivering greater
amounts of information to the public.

306. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(2) (2000) (prohibiting serial copying of works);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000) (prohibiting the distribution of copying
devices that do not conform to specified regulations).
307. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454-55.

308. Id. at 455.
309. Netanel, supra note 146, at 81.
310. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454-56.
311. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit's
recent Eldred decision).

